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ELECTRONIC TICKETING - CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE*
I. INTRODUCTION
E LECTRONIC TICKETING ("e-ticketing") is arguably the
most critical commercial tool aimed at cutting rising costs in
the airline industry. The International Air Transport Associa-
tion ("IATA") has announced that its vision is to accomplish 100
percent implementation of e-ticketing worldwide by 2007.1 At
present, IATA processes 300 million paper tickets a year, each of
which costs U.S. $10 to process.2 An e-ticket will only cost U.S.
$1 to process, saving the industry approximately U.S. $3 billion
annually.' In addition to the significant savings that the e-ticket
offers, it will also ensure easier handling of itinerary changes
and last minute travel decisions, obviate the danger and incon-
venience associated with lost tickets, and expedite the use of in-
ternet facilities. The e-ticket will bring aviation commerce to
the final frontier of the communication revolution by eliminat-
ing cumbersome processes and reducing costs related to post-
age, shipping, storage, and accounting. Using e-tickets will
eliminate costs relating to producing envelopes and ticket jack-
* LL.B. (Colombo) 1979, LL.M. (Monash) 1982, Ph.D. (Colombo) 1992, DCL
(McGill) 1996, FRAeS FCILT. Dr. Abeyratne is Coordinator, Air Transport
Programmes at the International Civil Aviation Organization. He has worked in
aviation management for over twenty-five years both in the airline industry and
the regulatory industry and has published numerous books, book chapters, and
leading articles on aerospace law. He is also Professor of Aeropolitical Law and
Policy at the john Molson School of Business at Concordia University in Montreal
and a sitting member of the Space Law and International Trade Law Committees
of the International Law Association.
I Press Release, International Air Transport Association, IATA Takes Giant
Steps Forward to Simplify the Business (May 30, 2005), available al http://
ww.iata.org/pressroom/pr/2005-05-30-04.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
2 Speech by Giovanni Bisigniani, President, International Air Transport Associ-
ation (Nov. 16, 2001).
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ets. Above all, the use of e-tickets will allow airlines to replace
airport counter staff and space with self-service check-ins.
The airline industry has already taken initial measures toward
reaching the overall goal of issuing 100% of airline tickets elec-
tronically. Global Distribution Systems ("GDS"), major airlines,
and other vendors have already implemented a resilient and du-
rable e-ticket technology.4
The ultimate aim of an e-ticket-based airline industry is to get
rid of the existing cumbersome processes through bilateral ar-
rangements, which cost annually anywhere between U.S.
$50,000 and U.S. $150,000 for implementation and administra-
tion.5 This practice of exchanging e-tickets with all commercial
partners, however, is far too expensive for the 420 carriers oper-
ating air services globally. As a solution, both IATA and SITA6
have established a "hubbing" system where a designated hub will
distribute e-tickets. This approach has not been popular among
airlines, some of which prefer to transact business with their cli-
ents directly through the internet.
With all its efficiency, the internet is not bereft of problems.
The most stultifying of these is the unavailability of internet ac-
cess in less technologically sophisticated regions such as Africa
and remote parts of Asia. Additionally, intra-regional or domes-
tic passengers may not be able to purchase tickets through the
internet from small airlines unless internet cafes can accept cash
from customers and settle with airlines through credit card
transactions. A practical approach to overcoming the internet's
lack of global reach is for airlines to enter into suitable code-
sharing systems where, for a small fee, one airline could issue
electronic tickets on behalf of another.
The exponential increase of online sales of consumer goods
serves as a good reason for airlines to follow the e-route. Statis-
tics indicate that online sales are too prodigious to ignore, rep-
resenting 2% of all retail sales in 2000 and jumping to 7% in
2004. 7 Although multi-channel retailers generate 75% of e-com-
4 See E-Ticket Challenges-Interlining and Small Carriers, AIRLINES INT'L, Oct.-Nov.
2004, at 2.4.
5 Id.
6 Airline Telecommunications and Information Services (SITA).
7 Bill Grabarek, E-Partnerships Essential for Retailers, DIRECT MKTG. Bus. INTELLI-
GENCE, Sept. 1, 2004, available at http://www.directmag.com/ar/market-
ing-epartnerships~essentialretailers (last visited Aug. 28, 2005). Between the
first half of 1998 and 1999, IBM's e-commerce revenue rose from $472 million to
$6 billion. See Feldman, infra note 10.
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merce transactions, offline retailers also capture a significant
slice of the electronic commerce market.' Simple e-commerce
websites are available for as little as U.S. $99. Airlines could also
join an existing online store for a rental fee of a few thousand
dollars a year or could spend millions of dollars on a sophisti-
cated commercial website" An e-ticket website requires not only
a browsing facility to view different goods, but must also enable
the potential buyer to review available products and services and
to pay for them online. This may require the use of an online e-
commerce hosting service.
The above notwithstanding, the process of selling airline tick-
ets electronically is not as simple as it may seem. To obtain max-
imum returns from e-ticketing, airlines must decide whether to
use standard websites or portals or to become portals them-
selves."' Unfortunately, airlines have reportedly been dragging
their feet, not recognizing e-commerce possibilities available to
them over major online distributors such as Amazon.com. 1
They have been inhibited by their dogmatic reliance on tradi-
tional sales agents, their age-old regulatory practices, and their
inexplicable reluctance to update computer software. Airlines
have refused to transcend the expectation of being sought after
by their clients and have not aggressively pursued the market.
Encouragingly, carriers such as United Airlines have created e-
super stores such as Buy-Travel.com. These stores sell car rent-
als, cruises, and holiday packages in addition to airline tickets.
Smaller airlines such as Easyjet have followed, graduating from
telephone sales to e-ticketing on the world wide web.
E-ticketing also brings to bear the business issues and com-
plexities inherent in a paperless transaction. For example, e-
commerce fraud, which is on the rise, raises emergent issues of
security and privacy, together with the frustrating and often dis-
tracting spain and pop-up intervention. The most ominous le-
gal issue which e-commerce portends is the transaction itself,
which may have to be judicially interpreted.
8 Id.
9 Cary Griffith, The E-Commerce Dilemma, available at http://www.computeruser.
com/articles/2005,5,38,1,0501,01.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
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II. CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. DEFINITIONS
E-commerce in general and e-ticketing in particular are no
longer subject to a static set of legal rules driven by judicial pre-
cedent. The nature of e-ticketing in air transport 2 is constantly
changing, requiring vigilant adaptation by legislators and regu-
lators. The United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law ("UNCITRAL"), at its thirty-eighth session in July, 2005 was
scheduled, at the time of writing, to discuss a Draft Convention
on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Con-
tracts to promote international trade. The Draft Convention re-
gards trade as an important element in promoting friendly
relations among states on the basis of equality and mutual bene-
fit. The Draft Convention also evinces the problems created by
the uncertain legal value of electronic communications in inter-
national contracts as an obstacle to international trade. 3 The
fundamental premise of the Draft Convention is that increased
electronic communication improves the efficiency of commer-
cial activities, enhances trade connections, and allows new ac-
cess to previously remote parties and markets, thereby
promoting trade and e-commerce, domestically and internation-
ally.14 The Convention applies to the use of electronic commu-
nications related to the formation or performance of a contract
or agreement (implying that they are not the same) between
parties whose businesses are not located in the same country.1 5
Article 1 implies that the Draft Convention applies to interna-
tional business between two or more parties conducting busi-
ness, suggesting that it excludes a contract by a person who
purchases an e-ticket for his personal use. The Draft Conven-
tion clarifies this in Article 2(1) (a) which states categorically
12 See Ruwantissa Abeyratne, E-Commerce and the Airline Passenger, 66 J. AiR L. &
COM. 1345 (2001) (describing the e-ticketing process); Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The
Use of E-Commerce in Carriage by Air, Some Legal Issues, 6 TOLLEY'S CoMm. L. 798
(2001); Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The E-ticket and Trademark Issues of Computerized Air-
line Ticketing, 5 TOLLEY'S COMM. L. 58 (2000).
13 Draft Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Con-
flicts, U.N. Commission International On Trade Law, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/577 (2004), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/v04/
592/87/pdf/v0459287.pdPOpen element (last visited May 1, 2005).
14 Id. Annex 1, at 3.
15 Id. art 1.
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that the instrument excludes contracts concluded for personal,
family, or household purposes. "
The inapplicability of the Draft Convention to personal trans-
actions conducted by a person with an airline based in a foreign
country (although the "place of business"' in Article 1 may not
necessarily apply exclusively to the head office of the airline)17
does not preclude its relevance to definitions and conditions re-
lating to the purchase of e-tickets. For example, the word "com-
munication" is defined as "any statement, declaration, demand,
notice or request, including an offer and the acceptance of an
offer, that the parties are required to make or choose to make in
connection with the formation or performance of a contract.""8
The same provision defines an "electronic communication" as
"any communication that the parties make by means of data
messages, which comprise information generated, sent, received
or stored by electronic, magnetic, optical or similar means, in-
cluding but not limited to electronic data interchange ("EDI"),
electronic mail telegram, telex or telecopy."' An electronic
contract has to be initiated by an "originator," who is "a party by
whom, or on whose behalf, the electronic communication has
been sent or generated prior to storage, if any, but it does not
include a party acting as an intermediary with respect to that
electronic communication. '"20 The originator has to address his
communication to an addressee, the intended direct recipient
of the communication, rather than an intermediary of the elec-
tronic communication.2 The Draft Convention categorically
states that a communication or a contact shall not be denied
validity or enforceability on the sole ground that it is in the form
of an electronic communication and that, although nothing in
the instrument compels a party to use or accept electronic com-
munications, certain inferences may be drawn from a party's
conduct that the party intends to use an electronic medium to
transact his business."
16 Id. art. 2.
1 Id. art. 4.
18 Id. art. 4(a).
19 Id. art. 4(b).
2) Id. art. 20.
21 Id. art. 4(e).
22 Id. art. 8(1).
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B. CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRACT
The originator of the e-communication usually clearly indi-
cates the price of the ticket offered 3 and a quotation of a ticket
that will be sold would not amount to an offer but a mere invita-
tion for the buyer to make an offer.24 An internet price list of
airline tickets may also be construed as an invitation for an of-
fer.25 An airline ticket has the distinctive characteristic of not
only specifying the origin and destination of travel along with
the price of the fare, but also including contractual terms that
the seller has to take reasonable steps to bring to the notice of
the buyer, and on which there is an established cursus curiae on
other modes of transportation. 26 In the 1971 case of Thornton v.
Shoelane Parking Ltd., the court held that the operators of a park-
ing lot did not take sufficient steps to ensure that contractual
terms appearing on the walls of the parking space also appeared
on the parking ticket issued to customers. 27 An e-ticket would
directly draw from the contractual principle, enunciated by the
Ontario Court of Appeals in Craven v. Strand Holidays (Canada)
Ltd., that a tour operator should take reasonable steps to bring
limitation of liability provisions and conditions attached to the
tour package he was selling to the attention of the customer.2
The original court had ruled that, since the customer was not
aware of the terms of limitation, he was not expected to abide by
it. The court of appeals held:
the question should have been followed by another question to
establish whether Strand (the tour operator) had taken reasona-
ble measures to draw the limitations and conditions of the Con-
tract to the customer's attention. If they did, the respondents
ought to have been familiar with them and could not successfully
rely on their unreasonable failure to read them.29
From the perspective of the vendor, the advantage of the e-
ticket is the ample opportunity to hyper-link conditions of the
23 Storer v. Manchester City Council, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1403 (C.A.); McGrath v.
Black [1909] 43. N.S.R. 554; Calgary Hardwood & Veneer Ltd. v. Canadian Nat'l
Ry. [1977] 74. D.L.R. (3d) 284.
24 See Reynen v. British Columbia Lottery Corp. [1997] 36 B.C.R. (3d) 282.
25 Granger & Son v. Gough [1896] A.C. 325.
26 Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. [1877] 2. C.P. D 416; Hood v. Anchor Line
(Henderson Bros.) Ltd. [1918] A.C. 837; Union Steamships Ltd. v. Barnes [1956]
5 D.L.R. (2d) 536; Dipaolo Mach. Works Ltd. v. Prestige Equip. Corp. [1996] 5.
C.P.C. (4th) 175 (Ont).
27 Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd. [1971] 2. W.L.R. 585.
28 Craven v. Strand Holidays (Can.) Ltd., [1982] 140 O.R. (2d) 186.
29 Id. at 40-41.
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contract on the web and rely on the defense that a claimant
would be presumed to read the conditions of contract before
making the purchase through the internet. The electronic no-
tice also precludes the often-adduced argument that the condi-
tions are unreasonable and therefore unenforceable when the
buyer does not read them. When purchasing an e-ticket, the
party buying the ticket is deemed to assent to the terms whatever
they may be, although early cases have established that some de-
gree of special care is needed to notify the purchaser of condi-
tions that the court may deem unreasonable. In the 1956 case
of Spurling v. Bradshaw, ° Lord Denning expressed the view that
"some clauses which I have seen need to be printed in red ink
on the face of the document with a red hand pointing to it
before the notice could be held to be sufficient."3
III. THE ELECTRONIC TICKET
A. CYBER CONTRACTS
Cyber contracts, commonly called "click-wrap" agreements,
are formed over the internet in their entirety. 2 The essence of
a "click-wrap" agreement is that when an offeree visits the web
site of a person who has advertised his goods for sale at a given
price, and agrees to buy those goods and indicates his assent to
be bound by the terms of the offeror or person who offers to sell
goods on the internet, a contract is concluded. 3 There is no
30 J. Spurling Ltd. v. Bradshaw [1956] 1 W.L.R. 461; Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt
[1910] 2; K.B. 937, Tocher v. Thompson [1913] 15 D.L.R. 31 (Man. C.A.); Hong
Kong Fir Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., [1962] 2 Q.B. 26
(CA).
31 j Spurling Ltd., 1 W.L.R. at 466; see also Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd.,
[1971] 2 W.L.R. 585; Kalmer v. Greyhound Lines of Canada [1979] 30 A.R. 124;
Dixon v. The Queen in Right of British Columbia 12 B.C.L.R. 110 [1997]; In-
terfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989] Q.B. 433
(CA).
32 Click-wrap agreements derive their name from shrink-wrap agreements, by
which most software is sold today. It is a well-established fact that in common law
jurisdictions, click-wrap agreements are enforceable contracts. See Hotmail Corp.
v. Van Money Pie Inc., where the United States District Coast for the Northern
District of California agreed that once an offeror clicks on the button "I agree"
denoting that he accepts all conditions of the offeree, a valid and effectual con-
tract is concluded. Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie Inc., No. 1998 WL 388389
(N.D. Cal. 1998).
33 For more information see Martin H. Samson, Click-Wrap Agreement Held En-
forceable, 219 N.Y. L.J. 124 (1998).
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paper exchange, nor is there the need for the signature of ei-
ther party to the contract. 4
The initial element of contract formation is the intention to
contract and to conclude the process on the part of both the
offeror and offeree. Courts have insisted that proof of an offer
to enter into legal relations upon definite terms must be fol-
lowed by the production of evidence from which the courts may
infer an intention by the offeree to accept that offer. Thus, the
parties' statements in the process of negotiations are of extreme
importance in the determination of a concluded contract. The
1840 case of Hyde v. Wrench offers the seminal principle that a
series of communications from either party may impinge an
original offer." In the Hyde case, the defendant, on June 6, of-
fered to sell an estate to the plaintiff for £1,000.36 On June 8th,
in reply, the plaintiff made an offer of £950, which was refused
by the defendant on June 27th. v However, on June 29th, the
plaintiff wrote to the defendant that he was now willing to pay
£1,000.3
The importance of Hyde decision lies in the fact the court
held that no contract existed.39 The plaintiff had, by rejecting
the offer made on June 6th, precluded himself from reviving the
offer later.4 ° In other words, once an offer is rejected by the
offeree, he cannot go on the basis that the offer would still stand
in its original form. When this principle is applied to an auction
where the airline considers public offers over the Internet, any
offer made by a member of the public for a seat on a flight can-
not be rejected by the airline and later revived.
A counter-offer situation is different, where an airline nomi-
nates an alternate sum as acceptable. For example, if A offers
over the internet $100 as a price he would pay for a seat from
34 See, e.g., Corinthian Pharm. Sys., Inc. v. Lederle Labs., 724 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.
Ind. 1989) (dealing in medicinal drugs on a wholesale basis ordered a consign-
ment of drugs through a computerized telephone ordering system).
35 Hyde v. Wrench (1840) 3 Beav. 334; see Kinghorne v. The Montreal Tel. Co.,
[1859] 18 V.C.Q.B.R. 60. "We must look, I think, in the case of each communica-
tion, at the papers delivered by the party who sent the message, not at the tran-
script of the message taken through the wire at the other end of the wire, with all
the chances of mistakes in apprehending and noting the signals, and in transcrib-
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Montreal to Toronto, the airline can counter-offer the seat for
$125, thus making itself the offeror. Here, unlike the situation
in the Hyde case, there is no outright rejection of the offer.
In the instance of an auction carried out over the Internet,
the primary issue at stake in the determination of a contract is
whether the parties intended to conclude the contract. For in-
stance, if a person offers a certain price to the airline over the
Internet and the airline gives him a reference number, the allo-
cation of that number may not indicate acceptance of the offer
by the airline. The 1989 case of Corinthian Pharmaceutical Systems
Inc. v. Lederle Laboratories is a good example.4 In that case, a
person dealing in medicinal drugs on a wholesale basis ordered
a consignment of drugs through a computerized telephone or-
dering system.4 2 The order was strategically placed a day before
a price increase was to take effect.43 The wholesaler ordered
through the manufacturer's automated telephone order system,
and, after he placed the order, he received a computer-gener-
ated "tracking number" from the manufacturer's computer sys-
tem.44 There was absolutely no human interaction in the
transaction.4 5 Subsequently, when the manufacturer refused to
sell the consignment of drugs at the pre-increase price, the
court agreed with manufacturer's position that the tracking
number was not an acceptance of the offer, but merely an ac-
knowledgment of the receipt of the order.46 The court con-
cluded that no contract had been concluded and denied the
wholesaler purchase of the goods at the lower price.4 7
The early case of Henkle v. Pape brings out another difficulty
that might arise from contracts transacted through the in-
ternet.4" The Henkle case, decided in 1870, concerned a transac-
tion carried out through telegraphic messages for the sale of up
to fifty rifles.49 The offeror sent the offeree a telegraphic mes-
sage offering to buy three rifles but the message was transcripted
to the offeree as "the"' instead of "three" rifles. 50 Accordingly,
the offeree held the offeror liable for the purchase of all fifty
41 724 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
42 Id. at 606-08.
43 Id. at 607.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 606-08.
46 Id. at 606-11.
47 Id. at 611.
48 Henkle v. Pape, [1870] 23 L.T. 419.
49 Id.
5() Id.
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rifles. 51 The court held that the offeror could not be held liable
for the error of the telegraph clerk who had wrongly deciphered
the message and, therefore, no contract had been concluded.52
The 1870 principle of the Henkle decision still holds water in
the instance of a contract transacted through the internet in
that the latter instance, like the Henkle case, involves a contract
negotiated through electronic means. In just an instant, there is
always the risk that messages intending to create contractual ob-
ligations may not reach their destination, or, perhaps more omi-
nously, are received by the recipient in a form other than the
one originally sent. In the seminal Canadian case of Kinghorne
v. Montreal Telegraph Co.,53 decided in 1859, the court subsumed
the reasons behind the determination of an electronic contract
which may still apply:
We must look, I think, in the case of each communication, at the
papers delivered by the party who sent the message, not at the
transcript of the message taken through the wire at the other end
of the wire, with all the chances of mistakes in apprehending and
noting the signals, and in transcribing for delivery.54
Of course, compared to early telegraph systems that caused
numerous problems, the modern internet is more reliable, and
errors such as those encountered in the Henkle and Kinghorne
cases may not be commonplace. However, there is the possibil-
ity of garbled messages flowing through the internet, where
courts would have no hesitation in determining the real intent
of the parties to conclude a contract as the preliminary issue.
The above concerns are by no means intended to suggest that
contracts through the internet are questionable in general
terms. In fact, current computer-based technologies are more
effective than earlier technologies at assisting parties to unam-
biguously conclude their agreement. For example, electronic
data interchange ("EDI") as a commercial medium has evolved
in Canada to the extent that the EDI Council of Canada's Model
TPA encourages parties to be extremely precise in identifying
particular messages as constituting an order (or offer) by intro-
ducing a two-phased process: the first using a functional ac-
knowledgment of the offer (such as the tracking number in the
51 Id.
52 See also Harper v. W. Union Tel. Co., 130 S.E. 119 (S.C. 1925); Postal Tel.
Cable Co. v. Schaefer, 62 S.W. 1119 (Ky. App. 1901).
53 Kinghorne v. Montreal Tel. Co. [1859] 18 V.C.Q.B.R. 60.
54 Id. at 64.
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Corinthian case) and the second using a purchase order
acknowledgment.
B. TIME AND PLACE OF CONTRACT
There is no doubt as to when and where the contract comes
into being when parties sign a contract simultaneously in a face-
to-face setting. It is often not a trivial legal task to determine
when and where a contract comes into being when either an
offer, an acceptance, or both, are transacted by telegraph, telex,
fax, EDI, e-mail, the internet, or telephone. The uncertainty be-
gan before the advent of the telegraph with the mail delivery
system. The general contract law principle is that an offer is not
considered accepted until the acceptance of the offer is received
by the offeror. In England in the 19th century, judges devel-
oped an exception to this rule for offers and acceptances sent by
the mail.55 The so-called "mailbox rule," or "expedition theory,"
prescribes that where an offer is sent in the mail and use of mail
is reasonable in the circumstances or expressly contemplated by
the parties, the contract takes effect immediately when accept-
ance is posted in the mail (rather than when the offeror receives
the acceptance). This rule shifts the uncertainty of delays in
communications from the offeree to the offeror.56 Shifting this
risk to the offeror and giving the concomitant assurance to the
offeree was reasonable because of the increased reliability of the
Royal Mail in the 1800s, to the point where multiple deliveries a
day in larger urban centres were the norm. The expedition the-
ory is a good example of a legal doctrine being firmly grounded
in the communication environment and commercial processes
of its day.
As the telegraph, telephone, and other new communication
technology evolved into widespread use, cases established prin-
ciples as to when and where contracts were concluded. In Carow
Towing, an early Canadian case, the court held that a contract
entered into by telephone should be treated like a letter and
should follow the expedition theory, with acceptance occurring
at the place the acceptance is spoken and not where the offeror
hears the acceptance.57 By contrast, in the Entores case, a later
55 Schiller v. Fischer [1981] 124 D.L.R. (3d) 577, 580.
56 The rule was imputed to instances where telegraphic transactions were in-
volved. See Ee Stevenson Jacques & Co. v. McLean [1880] 5 Q.B.D. 346; Carow
Towing Co. v. The "Ed McWilliams" [1919] 46 D.L.R. 506 (Ex. Ct.).
57 Carow Towing Co., 46 D.L.R. at 506.
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British decision, Lord Denning concluded that, for simultane-
ous means of communications like the telephone, the place
where the contract is concluded is where the offeror hears the
acceptance, and thus, if the line goes dead during the telephone
conversation, the onus is upon the offeree to call the offeror to
ensure the words of acceptance had been communicated to the
offeror.51 Subsequent cases in Canada have followed the deci-
sion in Entores rather than the approach in Carow Towing,59 with
the exception of Quebec where, until recently, the preponder-
ance of case law has followed the principle that telephone con-
tracts arise when and where the offeree speaks its acceptance6 °
since the enactment of the current Civil Code of Quebec in Janu-
ary 1994, Article 1387 explicitly provides that, with respect to
telephone contracts, acceptance occurs when and where the ac-
ceptance is received. It is interesting to note that the Entores
decision was also followed in two fax cases, one in Nova Scotia61
and one in New Zealand, 62 where each held that a contract
made by fax arises when the offeror receives by fax the accept-
ance of the offeree.
The court in the Entores case also held that telex technology
results in instantaneous communication, with the result that ac-
ceptance occurs when the message is received by the offeror.
This approach was confirmed in a decision by the House of
Lords in the Brinkibon case.6" In this case, the court held that,
although telex communications should be categorized as simul-
taneous, the specific constituent elements and factors in the
communications system concerned need to be carefully
considered:
The senders and recipients may not be the principals to the con-
templated contract. They may be servants or agents with limited
authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach,
the designated recipient immediately; messages may be sent out
58 Entores, Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp., [1955] 2 All E.R. 493, (C.A.).
59 See, e.g., McDonald & Sons Ltd. v. Export Packers Co. Ltd. [1979], 95 D.L.R.
(3d) 174 (B.C.S.C.). See also Re Viscount Supply Co. Ltd. [1963], 40 D.L.R. (2d)
501 (Ont. S.C.); Nat'l Bank of Canada v. Clifford Chance [1996], 30 O.R. (3d)
746 (Gen. Div.).
60 Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. Bonavista Fabrics Ltd., [1984] C.A. 52 (Que.
C.A.).
61 Balcom (Joan) Sales Inc. v. Poirier [1991], 288 A.P.R. 377, 383 (N.S. Co.
Ct.).
62 Gunac Hawkes Bay (1986) Ltd. v. Palmer, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 297 (H. Ct.).
63 Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl & Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH,
[1982] 1 All E.R. 293 (H.L.).
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of office hours, or at night, with the intention, or on the assump-
tion, that they will be read at a later time. There may be some
error or default at the recipient's end which prevents receipt at
the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The mes-
sage may have been sent and/or received through machines op-
erated by third persons. And many other variations may occur.
No universal rule can cover all such cases; they must be resolved
by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business
practice and in some cases by a judgment where the risks should
lie."
The recognition of the facts in the Brinkibon case raise a num-
ber of emerging issues in respect of EDI, e-mail, and internet
communication. Certain EDI transmissions, for example, will
fall into the simultaneous communications category. Much of
EDI is affected not between the trading principals, however, but
by use of intermediaries, so-called value-added networks
("VAN") or service providers. An EDI message could likely go
through the message sender's VAN, then through the recipi-
ent's VAN, and finally to the recipient. Similarly, e-mail
messages over the internet may be routed to electronic mail-
boxes from which the recipient has to download the messages.
In such instances, it may be more difficult to conclude that the
simultaneous communication rules should apply. Also, it may
be difficult to determine when exactly an electronic message ar-
rives at the recipient's location for purposes of being recognized
as legally effective. For instance, an early British case held that a
letter sent in a sealed envelope is not considered received until
it is opened by the addressee personally.6 5 Whether such a rule
should apply in the case of e-mail, or whether an e-mail message
should be deemed received when it is available to be viewed by
the intended recipient, regardless of the time at which the recip-
ient actually reads the message, is a moot point. Another ques-
tion is when should a telex or fax be deemed to have arrived at a
workplace? In one case,"' the court concluded that the fax was
deemed to arrive when the message was received by the recipi-
ent's machine on a Friday, after business hours, rather than the
following Monday morning when a person read the telex.
Given these ambiguities, prudent users of electronic com-
merce should try to avoid having to refer these issues to a judge.
Users' EDI Trading Partner Agreement or other similar docu-
64 Id. at 296.
65 Arrowsmith v. Ingle [1810], 3 Taunt. 234.
6 The "Pendrecht" [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 56 (Q.B.).
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ment, should set forth precisely what electronic message must
be received by which computer (i.e., the sender's or the recipi-
ent's VAN) in order for a contract to arise. This would clarify
questions as to when and where the electronic contract arose.
As to the "where" question, the parties to the TPA would be well
advised to select a governing law in advance, and to make sure
the VAN agreements contain the same jurisdiction so that there
is no question which law would apply if it were ever considered
necessary to resort to adjudication. This is particularly true for
EDI and internet transactions where each trading partner's
VAN, or internet service provider, may be in ajurisdiction differ-
ent from the customer, and therefore, the laws of four different
jurisdictions could apply if the parties remain silent on the gov-
erning law question. In such circumstances, as Lord Denning
observed in the Entores case concerning two parties in different
jurisdictions, the problems arise because the laws of the respec-
tive jurisdictions are different. Therefore, predicting a court's
probable response is difficult, given that the court will invariably
try to seek the most just remedy under the circumstances. In
some cases, this is truly a difficult task. As an example, the judge
in the Export Packers case recommended that the various rules
developed by the law over the years, such as the simultaneous
communication rule in the Entores case, should not be applied
in a rigid fashion:
When the common law rules relating to offer and acceptance
were under development the telephone did not exist. At that
time agreements were made by two or more persons getting to-
gether and reaching a common understanding. As the postal sys-
tem came into being elaborate rules were made by the courts
covering the mechanics of reaching a bargain by mail. Today a
person ordinarily resident in British Columbia may telephone
from Japan where he is on a business trip to a person ordinarily
resident in Ontario but who is also then visiting Italy. They may
agree to the same kind of contract which is the subject-matter of
this writ. It does not necessarily follow the place where the con-
tract was made was Japan and thatJapanese law governs its inter-
pretation. Alternatively, it would be hard to argue the place
where the contract was made was Italy and the law of that country
ought to apply to its interpretation. 67
This dictum clearly confirms the benefit accrued to users of
electronic commerce in crafting their own rules for dealing with
67 McDonald & Sons Ltd. v. Export Packers Co., [1979], 95 D.L.R. (3d) 174,
178 (B.C.S.C.) at 180.
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issues of contract formation. Making commercial relationships
more secure and predictable through contract, however, can be
a costly and time-consuming exercise. Therefore, this may be an
area ripe for law reform. In the United States, the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law is already
working toward establishing new rules under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. These rules would take the view that because in-
ternet communications are instantaneous, a contract comes into
existence when the sender of the offer receives an electronic
message signifying acceptance. This does not, however, answer
the question as to when the acceptance is effective if the offeror
was not present before the computer. In other words, does re-
ceipt require a human intervention and acknowledgement? In
determining the answer to this question, the court should con-
sider the purpose and function of the rule, the possibility of
prejudice by a particular holding, the reasonable expectations
of the parties, and who could bear the burden for helping to
"fix" the system if it needs it.
C. ISSUES OF JURISDICTION
Arguably, one of the key indicators that cyber contracts
should be construed as possessing special characteristics in the
context of performance is the need to resolve issues of jurisdic-
tion. Given the world-wide-web and its global application, the
most compelling question in this regard would pertain to the
trans-boundary applicability of an internet contract. If an offer
originated from a computer based in the vendor's office in Vir-
ginia, or as in the case of an e-ticket sale, an invitation to treat is
issued in Virginia and is responded to by the buyer in Paris, the
question at issue would be whether the seller "pushed" his mes-
sage to Paris or whether the buyer "pulled" the message from
Virginia. In such an instance, could the vendor claim that it is
unjust to apply French law merely because a computer in Paris
"pulled" or received his message? In the 1996 case of United
States v. Thomas,68 concerning criminal liability of the defendant
for posting pornographic pictures on his computer, the defen-
dant claimed that he had not "pushed" pornographic pictures
into Tennessee from his server in Los Angeles, and, therefore,
he should not be subjected to Tennessee's laws. The defendant
Thomas claimed that it was the other way around - that a com-
,'8 United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1996).
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puter in Tennessee "pulled" the pornographic pictures. 69 The
Thomas case clearly demonstrated the compelling need for
courts to determine whether a buyer or recipient of a message
"drags" a message and, therefore, whether the jurisdiction of the
recipient is the appropriate place for adjudication.
In determining jurisdiction in an e-commerce case, the most
fundamental issue that arises is whether the jurisdiction in
which the buyer or seller transacted the business concerned can
rule the entire internet. In the case of Minnesota v. Granite Gate
Resorts, Inc.,7" the Court of Appeals of Minnesota ruled that Min-
nesota law applied to an online gambling business located in Las
Vegas and operating through a server in Belize. The Minnesota
case coincides with some cases, and at the same time, differs
from other decisions in various jurisdictions of the United States
and Canada (such as those discussed below) that are inclined to
follow the approach that a jurisdiction cannot impose its adver-
tising, gambling, and consumer protection laws on the entire
internet.
The most convenient example of an e-ticket transaction
comes from the two jurisdictions of Canada and the United
States. Would an offeror in Canada, who offers $500 over the
internet for a round trip between Toronto and Miami, be able
to enforce an auction agreement against a United States airline
at its home base in Florida? In a case decided in 195271 in Ca-
nada, the plaintiff brought a case to the Ontario High Court
against an American radio broadcasting station. The station was
broadcasting allegedly libellous statements from across the bor-
der, but the broadcast could be heard over the air waves in Ca-
nada.7 2 The defendant radio station brought a motion of
dismissal, alleging that the Ontario Court in Canada had no ju-
risdiction to hear a case against a party to the action which was
an enterprise based in the United States.7" The Court dis-
agreed, and held:
A person may utter all the defamatory words he wishes without
incurring any civil liability unless they are heard and understood
by a third person. I think it a "startling proposition" to say that
one may, while standing south of the border or cruising in an
aeroplane south of the border, through the medium of modern
69 Id.
70 Minn. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).




sound amplification, utter defamatory matter which is heard in a
Province in Canada north of the border, and not be said to have
published a slander in the Province in which it is heard and un-
derstood. I cannot see what difference it makes whether the per-
son is made to understand by means of the written word, sound-
waves or other-waves in so far as the matter of proof of publica-
tion is concerned. The tort consists in making a third person
understand actionable defamatory matter. 4
In the more recent case of Pindling v. National Broadcasting
Corp.,7 5 with respect to an American television broadcast re-
ceived in Canada, the Ontario High Court held that the Prime
Minister of the Bahamas was entitled to bring the case to Ca-
nada instead of the United States. The Pindling decision illus-
trates the principle of "forum shopping" which can be culled
from the television context and applied to the analogous situa-
tion of a contract transacted over the internet.
The above principle may be derogated only in an instance
where the court seized of the case could invoke the principle of
"forum non conveniens," which allows the transfer of a suit from
an originally filed jurisdiction to some other jurisdiction which
is better placed to hear the case concerned. In the 1996 case of
National Bank of Canada v. Clifford Chance,7 6 the Canadian court
charged with hearing a case where a Toronto-based firm had
contracted with a law firm in the United Kingdom, transferred
the case to the United Kingdom although the contract was con-
cluded in Toronto, on the grounds that the contract concerned
a U.K.-based project and the legal advice obtained had been
U.K. law given by lawyers in the United Kingdom. Based on the
Clifford Chance principle, it would not be unusual for a common
law court to determine that, in an auction for an airline seat,
where the offer emanates from Canada over the internet for a
seat out of the United Kingdom on a U.K.-based carrier, the ap-
plicable jurisdiction would lie with the courts in the United
Kingdom, although the contract may have been concluded in
Canada.
There is a dichotomy in the judicial thinking with regard to
cases involving contracts concluded over the internet. On the
one hand, courts may refuse to bring a person into ajurisdiction
purely because he contracted with a business based in thatjuris-
74 Id. at 98-99.
75 Findling v. Nat'l Broad. Corp., [1984] 49 O.R. (Ed) 58 (H.C.J.).
76 Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Clifford Chance, [1996] 30 O.R. (3d) 746 (Gen. Div.)
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diction. This approach is illustrated by the 1994 U.S. decision in
the case of Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access Inc.," where
the court refused to grant jurisdiction to Florida where a resi-
dent of New York had used a Florida based online network in-
formation service merely to gain access to a database. Similarly,
the court in the famous 1997 SunAmerica case 78 refused to find
jurisdiction in a trademark case solely on the basis of the defen-
dant's operation of a general access web site:
Plaintiffs ask this Court to hold that any defendant who adver-
tises nationally or on the Internet is subject to its jurisdiction. It
cannot plausibly be argued that any defendant who advertises na-
tionally could expect to be hauled into Court in any state, for a
cause of action that does not relate to the advertisements. Such
general advertising is not the type of "purposeful activity related
to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair,
just or reasonable. 79
Similarly, in the 1997 case of Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,"° where
the defendant operated a passive general access web site, the
courts were of the view that to open worldwide jurisdiction
merely because the Internet offered worldwide access would be
iniquitous:
Where, as here, defendant has not contracted to sell or actually
sold any goods or services to New Yorkers, a finding of personal
jurisdiction in New York based on an Internet website would
mean that there would be nationwide (indeed, worldwide) per-
sonal jurisdiction over anyone and everyone who establishes an
Internet web site. Such nationwide jurisdiction is not consistent
with traditional personal jurisdiction case law nor acceptable to
the Court as a matter of policy.8"
The Hearst Corporation decision seems to have followed the ob-
servation of a case8 2 decided one year earlier where the court
held:
77 Pres-Kap, Inc. v. Sys. One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d. 1351, 1352-54 (Fla.
App. 1994).
78 IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. III. 1997),
affd in part, vacated in part, No. 1998 WL 51350 (7th Cir. 1998).
79 IDS Life, 958 F. Supp. at 1268.
80 Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
81 Id. at *1; see also Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir.
1997); Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, 99 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Pa.
1998).
82 McDonough v. Fallon McElligott Inc., No. 1996 WL 753991 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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Because the Web enables easy worldwide access, allowing com-
puter interaction via the Web to supply sufficient contacts to es-
tablish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction
requirement as it currently exists; the Court is not willing to take
this step. Thus, the fact that Fallon has a Web site used by
Californians cannot establish jurisdiction by itself.8"
The second line of judicial thinking is the converse of the
above approach, where courts have imputed to the non-resident
defendant the responsibility for complexities brought about by
the internet in its universal applicability. Therefore, in Com-
puserv Inc. v. Patterson,84 the court held a Texas-based computer
programmer legally responsible for his Ohio-based computer
network online service, and found him to be subject to Ohio
law. Although the defendant had never visited Ohio, he was
nevertheless found to be subject to Ohio law on the basis that an
electronic contract had been concluded in Ohio, the state
where the defendant was distributing his product.
The principle of universal application ofjurisdiction has been
invoked in other instances, where courts have accepted jurisdic-
tion on the basis of sales made to customers through the defen-
dant's web site,85 or based on soliciting donations,"6 or based on
subscribers signed up by the defendant for services delivered
over the internet,87 or for having follow-on contacts, negotia-
tions, and other dealings in addition to, and often as a result of,
the initial internet-based communication. 8  The common
83 Id. at *3.
84 CompUserv Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
85 Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech, Inc. 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997);
see also Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997) (findingjurisdiction based
on telephone and e-mail communications that consummated a business relation-
ship begun over Prodigy's "Money talk" discussion forum for financial matters).
In partially justifying this decision, the court noted that the use of fax technology,
and even live telephone conferences, can greatly reduce the burden of litigating
otut-of-state. Id.
86 Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
17 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
Is Resuscitation Techs. Inc. v. Cont'l Health Care Corp., No. 1997 'AL 148567
(S.D. Ind. 1997). The Court in this case was not concerned that the defendants
had never visited the forum state in person and concluded: "Neither is the matter
disposed of by the fact that no defendant ever set foot in Indiana. The 'footfalls'
were not physical, they were electronic. They were, nonetheless, footfalls. The
level of Internet activity in this case was significant." See also EDIAS Software Int'l,
L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ariz. 1996). In this case, the
court summed up the essence of many of the Internet jurisdiction cases by stat-
ing: "BASIS [the defendant] should not be permitted to take advantage of mod-
ern technology through an Internet Web page and forum and simultaneously
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thread that runs through the fabric of judicial thinking in this
regard is that parties who avail themselves of technology in or-
der to do business in a distant place should not then be able to
escape that place's legal jurisdiction. These cases are all-em-
bracing, from breach of contract claims to tort, including trade
libel; in several cases, courts have even found jurisdiction in
trademark infringement matters merely on the basis of a defen-
dant's general access web site,89 or linking to a national ATM
network through a telephone line indirectly through an inde-
pendent data processor in a third state.90
An evaluation of the United States civil cases discussed above
concludes that while the general trend is for courts to assert ju-
risdiction over non-residents based on their internet activities,
there are still a few situations where some courts may not apply
jurisdiction. 91
Although the choice of forum may extend universally, it does
not necessarily mean that enforcement from a judgment would
automatically follow. In the case of Bachchan v. India Abroad Pub-
lications Inc.,92 the plaintiff, an Indian national who had won the
right to have his case heard in the United Kingdom, was unable
to enforce judgment in New York. The New York court held
that the United Kingdom law applicable to the case did not ac-
escape traditional notions of jurisdiction." See also Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v.
Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997).
89 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Maritz,
Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Sys. Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). In the latter case, the
court observed:
In the present case, Instruction has directed its advertising activities
via the Internet and its toll-free number toward not only the state of
Connecticut, but to all States. The Internet as well as toll-free num-
bers are designed to communicate with people and their businesses
in every state. Advertisement on the Internet can reach as many as
10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone. Further, once
posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the
advertisement is available continuously to any Internet user. ISI
has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business within Connecticut.
Inset Sys., 927 F. Supp. at 165.
9o Plus Sys. Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo.
1992).
91 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
92 Bachchan v. India Abroud Publ'ns Int'l, 585 N.Y.S.2d. 661 (N.Y. Supp.
1992).
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cord with United States law and therefore the decision could
not be enforced in the United States." '
IV. CYBER SOCIETY AND CYBER CONTRACTS
The most distinguishing characteristic of the e-ticket is that it
is negotiated and transacted in an environment called "cyber so-
ciety" which is an independent, self-contained, self-ruled and
open environment not susceptible to regulation.94 Technically,
therefore, cyber society is a free society, untrammeled and un-
constrained by real space. Cyberspace is free from control of
individual governments, particularly those of industrialized na-
tions which can control activities of national and international
trade. Cyberspace is seamless and free of any considerations of
race, economic power, military strength, or status of birth. The
e-contract is egalitarian and freely available to any person on-
line. It is usually difficult to regulate a network of free and
equally accessible commerce, unless there is a uniform code of
conduct or filtering process that limits transactions based on an
identifiable category of vendors and purchasers, particularly by
demarcating geographic parameters which mandate the applica-
tion of certain national laws as appropriate.15 The global mar-
ketplace introduced by the internet brings to bear the renewed
impetus to have legal coordination of principles, not through an
omnibus convention but rather through a harmonious balance
of generally applicable laws of countries which could be part of
an arrangement to common rate their laws on internet con-
tracts.96 The first step would be to determine whether cyber-
space, in which an e-ticket is generated, is a place susceptible to
a particular jurisdiction or whether it is just a means of commu-
nication. One commentator favors the view that cyberspace is
93 Id. at 665.
94 Lawrence Lesig, THE LAWvs OF CYBERSPACE available at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/lessig.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
95 An example is the Rights Protection System (RPS) applicable to the photo-
graphic industry which enforces national law on the internet through a national
protection system.
96 See David Goddard, Does the Internet Require New Norms? INT'L Lkw FORUM
Du DROIr INTERNATIONAL 2: 183, 187 (2000). The author argues against the adop-
tion of an all purpose convention or multilateral treat), for internet contracts on
the grounds that various elements of contact, tort and property laws will have to
be integrated; an attempt at coordination of particular technologies will bring
about distortions between different types of transactions; a whole range of bor-
derline issues will have to be addressed, and the rapid evolution of technology
will overtake and make outdated a multilateral treaty in short time. Id. at 192.
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neither a place nor a state of mind but rather a means of com-
munication, susceptible to being identified as a continuum of
technological progress of which the genesis was the discovery of
electricity.97 The next logical step of reasoning involves the de-
termination of commercial rules for e-ticketing that are practica-
ble and predictable. The element of prediction of the outcome
of an e-ticket contract would enable the parties to envision ways
of carrying out the contractual process to finality without undue
risk of breach of contract, damages and compensation or en-
forceability. Dispute resolution is another area that should be
predetermined on a uniform basis. Any attempt at regularizing
or finding a common set of principles should essentially take
into account that states' authorities should not arrogate to
themselves extra-jurisdictional reach in regulating a cyber con-
tract, and that dispute resolution principles adopted must ac-
cord with the seamless nature of cyberspace. An international
body, such as a global cyber commission, should be tasked with
addressing issues of jurisdiction and dispute resolution, along
with adapting the cyber contract consistently and constantly with
evolving technology.
The basic premise with regard to e-ticketing and the princi-
ples applicable to the transaction is that an e-ticket purchase is a
simple contract that comprises any promise or set of promises,
made by one party to another, for the breach of which the law
provides a remedy. As in any conventional contract, there are
exceptional circumstances in which a party to an e-contract may
escape its obligation to perform, such as mutual or unilateral
mistake with regard to a basic assumption underlying which the
contract, misrepresentation of fact by one party inducing the
other party to enter into the contract, duress inducing one of
the parties to enter into the contract, lack of capacity to contract
(such as that of a minor or a person with impaired mental facul-
ties), public policy or illegality, absence of consensus ad idem (or
meeting of the minds), impossibility or unwillingness regarding
performance and frustration of the contract due to changing
circumstances which affect the contract's fundamental objective.
These principles amply justify the conclusion that a new set of
laws and principles of conduct, particularly applicable to cyber
contracts, is not necessary since electronic contracting is but a
97 Thomas P. Vartanian, Whose Laws Rule the Internet? A U.S. Perspective on the




method of entering into a contract. Admittedly, e-contracts
bring with them issues of jurisdiction and choice of law which
have been addressed earlier on in this article. The bottom line
is that the e-contract is not self-defining and, as some commen-
tators argue, the legal community should not expect that the
phrase "electronic-contract" will talismanically invoke a separate
and special body of rules. Neither one should expect traditional
law to remain stagnant despite significant new processes for
forming and recording agreements. 8
Although legal scholars generally discourage a multilateral
treaty on e-commerce for the reasons mentioned above, there
exists a system of guidelines in the form of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Commerce (the "Model Law") 99 which provides a
sense of direction for States wishing to adopt laws pertaining to
e-commerce. The Model Law aims at prescribing rules of con-
duct regarding the use of information generated, stored or com-
municated by electronic, optical or analogous means including
EDI, electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy. Article 6 of
the Model Law provides that, where a rule of law requires infor-
mation to be in writing or to be presented in writing, or pro-
vides for certain consequences if it is not, a data message ratifies
that form if the information contained therein is accessible so as
to be usable for subsequent reference. In the context of con-
tract formation, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an offer
and the acceptance of an offer may be expressed by means of
data message. When a data message is used in the formation of a
contract, that contract shall not be denied validity or enforce-
ability on the sole ground that a data message was used for that
purpose.' Article 17 of the Model Law refers specifically to
transport documents and stipulates that, if a right is to be
granted to, or an obligation is to be acquired by, one person and
no other person, and if the law requires that, in order to effect
this, the right or obligation must be conveyed to that person by
the transfer or use of paper document, that requirement is met
if the right or obligation is conveyed by using one or more data
messages, provided that a reliable method is used to render
such data message or messages unique. Furthermore, any com-
98 Donnie L. Kidd Jr. & William H. Daughtrey Jr., Adapting Contract Law to Ac-
commodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions, 26 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH.
L.J. 215, 270 (2000).
99 See Electronic Data Interchange, 32 EUROPEAN TRANSPORT L. 685 (1997) (pro-
viding the full text of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce).
"Io Id. art. 11.
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pulsory rules of law that apply to paper transactions on transport
also apply to transport transactions carried out through the ex-
change of electronic data messages.
V. THE WARSAW-MONTREAL EQUATION
Another contentious issue relating to e-tickets is the question
of how to notify a passenger of contractual conditions attached
to his carriage by air. The conventional manner of printing con-
ditions of carriage in the inner jacket of the airline passenger
ticket and baggage check alerts the passenger to the limitation
of liability of the carrier, in accordance with international trea-
ties. These formalities have followed traditional documentation
and may not be relevant in a world without paper tickets. A
question has been raised as to whether, in the absence of paper,
the passenger would be rendered destitute of some evidence of
contract-particularly for accounting, immigration, successive
carriage, and other purposes.'0 1
Existing law regarding the sale of air transport requires that a
passenger ticket and baggage check be delivered to the buyer
and that he be apprised of the conditions of carriage. The War-
saw Convention of 1929102 states that, for the transportation of
passengers, the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket which
shall contain certain details.' The Convention also says that
the absence, irregularity or loss of the passenger ticket shall not
affect the existence of the validity of the contract of transporta-
tion which shall nonetheless be subject to the rules of the Con-
vention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without
a passenger ticket having been delivered, it shall not be entitled
to avail itself of those provisions of the Convention that exclude
its liability. 10 4 Article 3 of the Convention provides that the in-
formation contained in the ticket delivered to the passenger
must contain the place and date of issue, the place of departure
and destination, the agreed stopping places, the name and ad-
dress of the carrier or carriers, and a statement that carriage is
subject to the liability provisions of the Convention.
101 Michael Mide, The Warsaw System of Liability in International Carriage by Air,
24 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L., 155, 159 (1999).
102 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air Oct. 12, 1929 available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/aircarriage.warsaw.
convention.1929/doc.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2005) [hereinafter the
Convention].
103 Id. art. 3.1.
104 Id. art. 3.2.
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The issue of "delivery" of an airline ticket to a person who
contracts with an airline for travel has been significant in air law.
Two cases, Lisi v. Alitalia115 and Chan v. Korean Air, '10clearly
demonstrate the importance of the meaning of "delivery" in re-
lation to the Convention. The important issue is not the "physi-
cal" delivery of the document of carriage, but the "purpose" of
delivery of the ticket to the passenger. In this sense, both cases
contain similar facts, and, in both cases, the respective tickets
were "delivered" to the passengers. The issue, however, was
whether the ticket served its purpose as envisaged by the courts,
vis-t-vis Article 3 of the Convention. A very important point in
this connection is that both cases, and indeed the precedent cur-
sus curiae, were subject to judicial "surgery" in the interpretation
of the meaning and purpose of Article 3 of the Convention. A
discussion of the two decisions would be meaningless if their
history, albeit very briefly, were not outlined.
Miller succinctly sums up the purpose of Article 3 when she
says :
Delivery is no longer the physical delivery of the ticket by the
carrier. The requirement is qualified in such a way that the deliv-
ery must allow the passenger (I) to realise that the carrier's liabil-
ity is greatly limited and (II) if he so wishes, to buy additional
insurance. In other words, there must be adequate notice of the
liability limitations. 107
The judicial arguments in the United States, where both these
cases were decided, are based on the fact that courts have im-
puted to the carrier the breach of the Convention by "non deliv-
ery" of the ticket when the ticket is physically delivered but does
not give the passenger the opportunity to read its contents, al-
though Article 3(1) (e) expressly provides that "a statement that
the carriage is subject to the rules of the Convention must be
included in the ticket," thereby precluding any need for imputa-
tion of liability. By bringing the case under "non delivery"
under Article 3.2, the courts effectively veer the case into the
realm of sanctions, which entails the all important question of
unlimited liability of the carrier."i'
105 Lisi v. Alitalia, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
106 Chan v. Korean Air, 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
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The predecessors to the Lisi and Chan decisions held that fail-
ure to give adequate notice of the liability limitation amounting
to the absence of delivery of the ticket has been addressed and
recognized in instances where either 1) the ticket was not physi-
cally delivered at all or 2) where the passenger received his
ticket, but did not have the opportunity to read the contents
therein and therefore, lacked sufficient time to take necessary
action (such as obtaining additional insurance coverage for him-
self). 1°9 These cases involved insane circumstances where the
passenger ticket was handed over to the passenger at the stairs
to the aircraft, just before boarding, and after the passenger had
boarded the aircraft, respectively.
Lisi challenged a United States appellate court to address the
issue of the ticket being delivered under normal circumstances,
but where the passenger was unable to read its contents owing
to the very small print used on the ticket. The court, recalling
its decision of Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.1 stated:
We read Article 3(2) to require that the ticket be delivered to the
passenger in such a manner as to afford him a reasonable oppor-
tunity to take measures to protect himself against the limitation
of liability. . ." The convention's arbitrary limitations of liabil-
ity ... are advantageous to the carrier, but the quid pro quo for
this one sided advantage is delivery of the passenger ticket...
which gives him notice that on the air trip he is about to take, the
amount of recovery ... is limited very substantially." 2
MacMahon, J., criticizing the small print in the ticket, stated
that the conditions of carriage were "camouflaged in Lilliputian
print in a thicket of conditions of contract" ' and unequivocally
decided that the ticket had not been delivered to the passenger
in the context of Article 3 of the Convention. Circuit Justice
Moore, dissenting, called the pronouncement by the majority
'judicial treaty making" where the judges have attempted to "re-
write" the Convention.' 14 According to Justice Moore, the lan-
guage of the treaty was clear and its parameters were clearly
stated. 15
109 Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 1996 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Warren
v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
110 Mertens, 234 F. Supp. at 223.
I Lisi, 370 F.2d at 512.
112 Id. at 513.
113 Id. at 514.




Chan v. Korean Air"' took a diametrically opposed stance by
stating that:
All that the second sentence of Article 3(2) requires in order to
avoid its sanction is the "delivery" of a passenger ticket. Ex-
panding this to mean . . . a passenger ticket in compliance with
the requirements of the Convention is rendered implausible by
the first sentence of Article 3(2) which specifies that irregular-
ity .. .shall not affect the validity of the contract.117
The court in this instance followed a previous decision118 and
held that there exists a contract even if the ticket is absent or
"irregular," and that the contract was still governed by all the
provisions of the Convention." 9
It must be noted that, while the Lisi case dealt with a ticket
with a 4-point print, the Chan case dealt with an 8-point print,
making it imaginable that the majority in the former case would
have been influenced by the minuscule print. It is also notewor-
thy that the 10-point print prescribed for the passenger ticket,
which was authoritatively considered by the latter court was set
by the Montreal Agreement of 1966, a private agreement be-
tween airlines rather than an international treaty. Valerie Kaiser
criticises the Chan decision on the grounds that the court was
inconsistent in terminology1 20 and used an interpretation of the
treaty while claiming to strictly follow the provisions of the Con-
vention. While citing a subsequent case,12 1 she concludes that
courts should not indulge in 'judicial treaty or law making"
(presumably implying that treaties have to be adhered to stricto
sensu). It is indeed relevant in this instance to inquire whether
the principles of contra proferentem have any place in this debate,
since, after all, Warsaw considerations are contractual considera-
tions. As for the question ofjudicial law making, it could well be
argued that the role of the judiciary has been rather simplisti-
cally relegated to the background.
116 Chan, 490 U.S. at 122.
117 Id. at 128.
1 Ludecke v. Canadian Pac. Airlines Ltd., 98 D.L.R. 3d. 52 (1979).
'1 Chan, 490 U.S. at 128.
1211 Valerie Kaiser, Comment, Chan v. Korean Airlines, 15 ANALS OF AIR & SPACE
L. 505, 507 (1990).
121 In reAir Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 9, 1982, 821
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987).
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The main thrust of the Montreal Convention of 1999,122 com-
pleted in Montreal on May 28, 1999, and aimed at replacing the
Warsaw Convention, is the attempt made throughout the treaty
to provide for the orderly development of international air
transport and its smooth operation. 123 With this approach, the
Montreal Convention implies a more flexible focus than the
Warsaw Convention by accommodating technological advance-
ment in the entirety of the transaction pertaining to carriage by
air. Article 3 provides that the travel document must include
information related to the places of departure and destination.
However, it does not insist on physical delivery of the airline
ticket. Instead, the Convention provides that any other means
which preserves the information in the ticket may be substituted
for the delivery of the document, provided the carrier offers the
passenger a written statement of the information so pre-
served. 124 This provision has obviously been designed to accom-
modate electronic ticketing or even document-less carriage
(except in the case of checked baggage for which a baggage
check or identification tag has to be delivered). Therefore, the
provision is relevant to the commercial exigencies pertaining to
current marketing practices and the airline product where carri-
ers would offer different services in apprising their customers of
information contained in an airline ticket. There is also a provi-
sion for a collective passenger ticket to be issued under the
Montreal Convention, and requiring that a minimum of infor-
mation be given to the passenger. 125 One requirement that re-
mains in the new regime is the need for notification of the
carrier's limits of liability and the identification of the weight of
goods in the case of an air way bill, which is calculated to ensure
that there are means to determine the carrier's maximum liabil-
ity in the case of a claim.
Should a seller of an e-ticket mislead potential purchasers
about the value of goods or services offered, he could be found
liable in tort for fraud. Misrepresentation regarding to on-line
transactions may encapsulate a broad range of trading activity
122 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air,
May 28, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/
air.carriage.unification.convention.montreal. 1999doc (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
123 Id., Preamble, 4.
124 Id. art. 3.2.
125 Id. arts. 3.1, 4.1.
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including the sale or auction of tickets,'2 6 although it is unclear
whether web sites conducting auctions of goods can be held lia-
ble for implied misrepresentation.127
VI. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that much of the
restrictive and compelling requirements regarding the sale of
the airline ticket that existed under the classical Warsaw regime
have been obviated both by practice and by the Montreal Con-
vention of 1999. The key area of contention could well be juris-
diction, where the cursus curiae has vacillated from applying the
buyer's jurisdiction to establishing the principle that a court's
jurisdiction should not apply to the internet on a global basis.
Be that as it may, the one question which is both critical and
which remains unanswered is: when one party sues another with
regard to an e-mail transaction, what is the domicile of the
seller, or, in other words, where does the seller reside for organi-
zational purposes? The other question at hand is whether states
can regulate cyberspace invitations to treat or solicitations to
transact, and, if so, what jurisdictional issues are involved. A re-
lated question would ask what specific laws can enforce an e-
transaction. Also, should the product placed on the public do-
main be registered, and, if so, in what country or jurisdiction?
Another concern that e-commerce could raise is the blurring of
distinction between goods and services offered over the
internet.
One approach toward the jurisdiction issue would be for
courts to purely consider the terms of negotiation and the na-
ture of the transaction, rather than the physical location of the
transaction. This would mean that contractual obligations,
rights, and liabilities of parties would drive the underlying crite-
ria for determining liability. Another consideration for individ-
ual states would be to create laws within their territories
requiring entrepreneurs conducting business out of those states
to include certain pertinent information when offering products
for sale on the internet, such as the country of origin of the
message, applicable conditions, or copyright provisions. To en-
sure that buyers and sellers know what law applies to a particular
126 See Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Airline Ticket Auctions on the Internet, 2 WORLD
COMPETITION 99 (1998).
127 Jennifer Couzin, Suing eBay: Going, Going, Going?, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD,
Nov. 13, 2000, at 1.
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e-transaction, states could issue uniform regulations to all sellers
who attempt to attract customers to their websites. Courts and
legislators should consider these measures to prevent any exer-
cise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by an individual state. Juris-
dictional determinations should be linked to a system of
jurisdictional determination of sites based on technological and
pre-programmed preferences of the user. The location of a
server should not necessarily pre-determine jurisdiction, but
should be taken into consideration within the overall perspec-
tive of the above mentioned criteria. Above all, generally ac-
ceptable principles, set and monitored through a public domain
supervisory body, should establish seamless principles to guide
adjudicatory bodies.
